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The High Court and the Bakke decision:

Is Affirmative
Action Reverse
Discrimination?
Many who have examined Bakke are shocked not so
much at the nature of the injury inflicted on special
admissions programs as at the fact that the assailant was
the Supreme Court of California. To those who have
watched that court in its strict enforcement of compulsory integration of secondary schools, for example, it
seems strange indeed.
Even a member of the court, Justice Mathew Tobriner the sole dissenter in the Bakke case - was startled
by the result. He wrote, "It is anomalous that the
Fourteenth Amendment that served as the basis for the
requirement that elementary and secondary schools
could be compelled to integrate, should now be turned
around to forbid graduate schools from voluntarily
seeking that same objective."
The court was obviously concerned about Third
World entry into the professions, and the decision's
author indicated that he accepted the importance of
Third World admission to medical schools as, arguendo.
a compelling state interest (the highest level of interest
under equal protection). The Supreme Court of Washington in the De Funis case had expressly found that the
state had a compelling interest in special admissions
programs. Nonetheless, the California court struck down
the scheme chosen to achieve that end - relying on what
appear to me to be two major fallacies concerning equal
protection.

The first fallacy is to be found in the court's
acceptance of the idea that equal protection is an
individual, as opposed to a group, claim. It makes a great
difference whether Bakke be allowed to claim that he
was discriminated against personally, as opposed to 16
other people specially admitted to the medical school, or
whether he is seen as pressing a claim for all others
similarly situated, as in white males, against the persons
admitted through the special admissions program. (Although the majority opinion talks about the possibility
of subgroups within the larger group of white males,
there is no indication that Bakke was a member of any
group more deserving of special admissions attention
than his Caucasian race.) It is difficult to make a claim
that white males, as a group, require special assistance in
admission to medical schools.
While there is language in equal protection cases
which suggests that equal protection is an individual
right, that idea seems difficult to square with the nature
of the equal protection claim. An equal protection
claimant must necessarily attack a classification. The
result of abandoning the classification will necessarily be
to treat those previously classified separately in the same
manner as others in a more favored group. Bakke, in
effect, asked that the favorable minority group classification be ended. If his claim is correct, it must of necessity
benefit all others not in the favored minority
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group - namely all whites. Benefiting whites as a group
at the expense of minorities as a group sounds a lot less
attractive than one individual's claim to personal equality.
That brings us to the second error in the court's
opinion: its acceptance of the idea that equal protection
applies equally to all groups. While the court recognizes
the potential importance of racial discrimination designed to increase Third World presence in the professions, it ultimately succumbs to the idea that racial
classification is almost impossible to justify, whatever
race is disadvantaged. That finding ignores the fact that
the Fourteenth Amendment (which brought equal
protection into the Constitution) was part of a trilogy of
amendments designed to end the vestiges of slavery. It
also ignores the fact that the compelling state interest
test on which it relies is a special test reserved for selected
cases: those affecting special constitutional rights (not
relevent here) and those affecting politically impotent
groups. All other equal protection cases are reviewed
under later standards.
It was precisely because of the political impotence of
racial minorities that the United States Supreme Court

Would Bakke have

succeeded in a suit

claiming disadvantage
because he lived in
the wrong place?
Certainly not
announced that it would require a compelling state
interest to justify using race as a classifier. No such
interest was ever found by the California Supreme
Court. By contrast, all claimants who objected to
unequal application of state regulation governing commerce were relegated to the rational relationship test and
all failed in the court. The court saw them as not in need
of special protection. If there are reasons for requiring a
showing of a compelling state interest to use race in a
classification that disadvantages minorities, surely there
is no reason to require so high a standard when racial
classification disadvantages a less politically impotent
group.
Another way of stating the same point is to say that
Bakke was disadvantaged by a number of preferences.
The school preferred applicants from some geographic
locations to applicants from others; the school preferred
physicians planning to practice in certain fields of
medicine over others. Would Bakke have succeeded in a
suit claiming disadvantage because he lived in the wrong
place or planned to practice the wrong type of medicine? Almost certainly not.
What then singles out race as requiring so high a
standard of justification? It is the political impotence of

racial minorities who have previously complained of
discrimination against them. Without that basis, there is
no reason to be more concerned about racial preference
than geographic preference. (Of course there are instances in which it is not easy to distinguish racial
classifications which benefit racial minorities from those
which act to their detriment. Professional special minority admissions, however, is not one.)
The court makes a good deal of the social cost of
special admissions programs. It points out that special
admissions programs impose a badge of inferiority on all
racial minority applicants accepted. If that is correct, it
must still be balanced against the claim made by the
University of California that the present alternative to
programs of the sort at Davis is to return to the pattern
of admitting whites almost exclusively.
The social balance is a difficult one. The real vice in
Bakke, however, is that the California Supreme Court
precludes a state from weighing these alternatives and
arriving at its own conclusion. It forbids any state to
conclude that the costs of the program are socially
warranted.
Finally, the decision recognizes that present admissions processes are not so sacrosanct that they must be
used to the exclusion of somewhat more subjective
criteria, such as interviews and recommendations. I think
it important to note that at a time when the ratio of
applicants to seats in professional schools (both in
medicine and in law) is so great, it is virtually certain
that a large number of well qualified applicants are
turned away by all schools every year. Thus, it seems to
me proper to view the admissions process as one of
selecting among a large number of qualified applicants
those that best meet the academic objectives of the
school.
Many conceive of special admissions as "lowering
standards"; yet, until we know a good deal more about
how to measure professional success, it seems extremely
improbable that one can select from so large a group of
applicants solely on the basis of formal credentials with
any hope of picking the best doctors or the best lawyers.
If that is true, why cannot a school select racial minority
applicants (at least in the numbers in which they are
presently accepted) in preference to taking an entire
class of whites? The California court was willing to
permit such selection for "disadvantaged" applicants.
At the time of this writing the Supreme Court of the
United States has granted a stay, pending the filing of an
appeal, which the regents of the University of California
have decided to do. The granting of the stay suggests the
willingness of the Court to make a decision on the
merits. (And for the purposes of this discussion, I will
assume the probability of such review.)
There are essnrtially five options for the Court. First,
it can summarily affirm the decision of the Supreme
Court of California.
Second, it can summarily reverse that decision based
on clear conflict with prior law.
Third, it can find a procedural reason for avoiding the
result and perhaps even vacate the decision, as was done
in De Funis v. Odegaard.
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Fourth, it can ameliorate the impact of the Bakke
decision, either by holding that discrimination against
whites is not cognizable at all or, more likely, that it is
reviewable only under easier tests of equal protection.
And finally, it can adopt the decision of the Supreme
Court of California insofar as it rules out racial preference and delete the portion of the opinion which
continues to authorize special admissions for so-called
disadvantaged students. Other minor possibilities suggest
themselves, but the most likely conclusions are the last
two mentioned.
The single most likely conclusion appears to be the
acceptance of the Bakke prohibition against racial
preference and the rejection of the special admissions
standards for disadvantaged students. This half-Bakke'd
solution could be seen as an extension of a recent ruling
holding employment discrimination against whites by
affirmative action programs to be cognizable under the
Civil Rights Act. It would be consistent with another
recent decision holding that District of Columbia police
applicants must pass a general screening test, although
that test has not been validated for police skills and
despite the fact that blacks disproportionately fail the
test.
Despite these, clues pointing to a restrictive result for
minority admissions programs, other factors point toward
what I believe to be the second most likely outcome: a
reversal based on finding the California court to have
applied the wrong test.
The Burger Court has been reluctant to follow the
Warren Court's lead in equal protection tests from the
beginning. In a number of cases, the Court has expressly
noted the possibility that the compelling state interest
test might be appropriate but that, since even the
rational relationship test was sufficient to invalidate the
state program, it would not decide which test was
required. The Court has also, without quite admitting it,
adopted a number of intermediate equal protection tests
in which the state's interest and the interest of the
affected group are balanced.
At the same time, the Court has developed a new
doctrine prohibiting irrebutable presumptions. Under
that doctrine, a legislative classification may be challenged on the grounds that it irrebutably presumes a
difference between those adversely classified and others.
For example, if pregnant school teachers are required to
take maternity leave at the end of their sixth month of
pregnancy, that may be viewed as an irrebutable
presumption that they are no longer fit to teach. On that
basis, the Court may require that a functional test be
substituted for the "irrebutable presumption."
The test is an obvious alternative to equal protection
analysis in dealing with the classification. And the Court
has also made it clear recently that it feels free to be
selective in the application of the test from case to case.
The point of these comments has been to sketch
some of the present law of equal protection to show that
the Burger Court has moved closer to balancing the
equities in each claim and farther from the Warren
Court's notion of clear strata of equal protection
enforcement.

George J. Alexander is dean of the University of Santa
Clara School of Law.
Since Bakke presents a state system far less outrageous (to say the least) than the systems of enforced
segregation reviewed in many of the prior cases, the
Burger Court seems in a better position than was the
Warren Court to act in favor of the affirmative action
program at Davis. While it seems unlikely that the Court
would review and approve the special admissions program at Davis, it seems within the realm of possibility
that it would see that the program should be judged by a
standard more permissive than compelling state interest.
Once announcing that the test which the California
court applied was the wrong one, the Supreme Court
would then be in a position to reverse and remand the
case. Freed of the necessity of applying the compelling
state interest test, the Supreme Court of California
might very well then reverse itself.
Assuming that the High Court will take the better
part of a year before it decides the Bakke case, there is
still the question of what one does in the interim. Justice
Mosk spent a good portion of his opinion addressing that

The Court may accept
the prohibition against
racial preference and
the rejection of

special admissions
standards for students
question, indicating that it was not necessary that one
admit students through a unitary admissions scheme. In
fact, he specifically suggested the acceptability of a
second rung of admissions decisions made principally for
disadvantaged students.
Furthermore, he indicated the appropriateness of
recruiting, interviewing and receiving letters of recommendation as aids in the admission of disadvantaged
students. (He did, however, say that these factors must
be racially neutral and must be applied in a racially
neutral manner.) Finally, he seemed optimistic that such
an admissions program would not necessarily reduce the
number of minority students enrolled in medical school
and might in fact increase them.
Unfortunately, Justice Mosk did not specifically
propose a definition of disadvantaged. For some schools,
that will not matter; for them, the permission which the
Supreme Court of California has given for abandoning
special admissions will suffice. For those who want to
continue, however, a difficult task lies ahead.
It seems to me that disadvantaged can be defined in a
racially neutral way - and be applied in a racially
(continued on page 47)
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Affirmative
(continuedfrom page 19)
neutral way without substantially diluting present
minority admissions programs. To the extent that it is
correct that racial minorities have been disadvantaged
educationally and economically (to mention but two
areas), those factors can probably be used as criteria for
defining disadvantaged.
For example, a factor in being disadvantaged may
well be some description of the neighborhood in which
the applicant grew up. Economic disadvantage may be
reached by questions concerning parental employment and the need for the applicant to have worked.
Educational disadvantage can be picked up by the
quality of the secondary schools attended. Inquiry into
native language and language spoken by parents should
also be helpful. And some question about career
objectives (even though one recognizes that students
cannot be held to them) seems useful.
I am not yet in a position to come up with a longer or
better list, though during the next year I will continue to
try to develop one. Believing as I do that disadvantages
have been disproportionately visited on racial minorities,
I feel fairly optimistic that one can define them in such a
way as to make the new programs available to racial
minorities.
It has always been true that special admissions
programs have been open to some whites whose disadvantages approximated that of racial minorities. It has
also been true that some members of racial minority
groups have not been given the benefits of special
admissions consideration because they seemed less disadvantaged than others. It would seem to me that one's
new disadvantaged-persons policy might well not go
beyond those present limits.
A second alternative is simply to hold fast to
whatever special admissions program presently exists.
Especially outside of California this seems an acceptable
interim solution. In a state, such as Washington, in which
the Supreme Court has held special admissions to be
constitutionally appropriate, the decision seems most
defensible. Similarly in New York, where the Court of
Appeals has upheld special admissions - at least in
dictum - one would seem to be in a defensible posture.
Alternatively, one might look to distinctions between
the Bakke holding and one's own situation. The Bakke
decision said that black doctors were not needed for
black patients. However correct that is, can it not be
argued that black lawyers are needed for black clients? Is
it not true that in criminal law, for example, there is a
great need for immediate rapport and client confidence
in the attorney, and does not our experience show a
greater likelihood of obtaining such confidence if black
people are provided black lawyers?
And second, Bakke indicated that the only problem
with the program was the failure of the state to
demonstrate the necessity of this racial distinction as a
means of more fully integrating the medical profession.

The court viewed the Davis admissions program as a
racial quota system. Perhaps one can distinquish one's
program as not being based on an established quota.
Those in private schools can certainly note that Davis is
a state school and that an argument can be made that
private schools cannot be challenged for similar programs because there is no "state action." I personally
have grave reservations about that argument, since the
U.S. Supreme Court this term decided in Runyon v.
McCrary that discrimination against blacks in Southern
private schools can be reached under the Civil Rights
Act. A similar finding about Northern private schools
engaged in what the Court might see as racial discrimination seems likely.
Nonetheless, one might argue that the foreclosure
attendant on denial at free or inexpensive state schools is
far more damaging than denial at a full tuition institution; the denial runs not only to admission to professional training but to state subsidy as well.
There remains one last avenue. The Court expressly
stated that cases requiring affirmative action could be
distinguished because they were premised on prior
discrimination. To the extent that it is possible to claim
prior discrimination, one would seem able to provide an
affirmative program for its eradication. Indeed, one
could presumably be compelled to provide such a
program under these circumstances.
A lot remains to be seen about this category of
rationale for affirmative action. For one thing, it is not
known whether any schools will willingly admit prior
discrimination. Both principle and fear of the mandatory
programs that might follow probably militate against
there being a large number.
Second, it remains to be seen whether claimants, such
as Bakke, will be able to prove that universities have
previously discriminated. Somehow, the spectacle of a
university pleading with a jury to find that it was in fact
guilty of past discrimination seems just a bit ludicrous.
And finally, it is not even completely clear whether
one is free to act because of one's past discrimination or
whether one must await some court or legislative or
executive finding dictating a certain prescription for
redress.
Bakke was, in my judgment, wrongly decided. There
appears to me to be a substantial chance that the
Supreme Court will reverse the case and direct that it be
retried under a less rigorous standard. In the interim, it
seems possible for schools to live with Bakke - if not to
avoid it - without dismantling their minority admissions
programs.
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Coming in February
To take the chill off winter, watch for our special
section in the February issue on summer law
programs abroad. You'll get the complete rundown
on what's available, how much they cost and when
and where to apply (which is sooner than you may
think).
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